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We’re reporting on a six-month period rather than annually to increase our level of transparency. For this report, we’ve continued with the more granular reporting we began in our 2021 reports.
At GitHub, we put developers first and work hard to provide a safe, open, and inclusive platform for code collaboration. Because the world is increasingly reliant upon the availability and limited disruption of code, we’ve developed policies to ensure that code remains available unless there is a clear and legitimate basis for removal or disruption. This means we are committed to minimizing the disruption of software projects, protecting developer privacy, taking action on abusive content, and being transparent with developers about content moderation and disclosure of user information. This kind of transparency is vital for informing our users about potential impacts on privacy, access to information, and the ability to dispute decisions that affect their content. With that in mind, we’ve published transparency reports going back eight years to inform the developer community about GitHub’s content moderation and disclosure of user information.
We continue to strive for excellence in our transparency reports by ensuring our reporting reflects the spirit of the Santa Clara Principles on Transparency and Accountability in Content Moderation and by following the guidelines set forth in the United Nations report on content moderation.
We promote transparency by:
We limit content removal, in line with lawful limitations, as much as possible by:
What’s included in this report
With this report, we continue our commitment to increased transparency by reporting on a six-month period (January to June 2022), in addition to our annual report.
In this reporting period, we continue to focus on areas of strong interest from developers and the general public, such as requests we receive from governments—whether for information about our users or to take down content posted by our users—and copyright-related takedowns. Copyright-related takedowns (which we often refer to as DMCA takedowns) are particularly relevant to GitHub because so much of our users’ content is software code and can be eligible for copyright protection. That said, only a tiny fraction of content on GitHub is the subject of a DMCA notice (under two in 10,000 repositories).
This report will also include the more granular reporting we introduced in late 2021 on the use of automated detection for the more egregious categories of Terms of Service violations: child sexual exploitation and abuse imagery, as well as terrorist and violent extremist content.
Putting that all together, in this Transparency Report, we’ll review stats from January to June 2022 for the following:
Continue reading for more details. If you’re unfamiliar with any of the GitHub terminology we use in this report, please refer to the GitHub Glossary.
GitHub’s Guidelines for Legal Requests of User Data explain how we handle legally authorized requests, including law enforcement requests, subpoenas, court orders, and search warrants, as well as national security letters and orders.
We follow the law and also require adherence to the highest legal standards for user requests for data. Some kinds of legally authorized requests for user data, typically limited in scope, do not require review by a judge or a magistrate. For example, both subpoenas and national security letters are written orders to compel someone to produce documents or testify on a particular subject, and neither requires judicial review. National security letters are further limited in that they can only be used for matters of national security.
By contrast, search warrants and court orders both require judicial review. A national security order is a type of court order that can be put in place, for example, to produce information or authorize surveillance. National security orders are issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, a specialized US court for national security matters.
As we note in our guidelines:
From January to June 2022, GitHub received and processed 212 requests to disclose user information, as compared to 172 in January to June 2021 and 163 in July to December 2021. Of those 212 requests, 122 were subpoenas (118 criminal or from government agencies; 4 civil), 56 were court orders, and 10 were search warrants. These requests also include 22 cross-border data requests, which we’ll share more about later in this report. These numbers represent every request we received for user information, regardless of whether we disclosed information or not, with one exception: we are prohibited from stating whether or how many national security letters or orders we received. More information on that can be seen below. We’ll cover additional information about disclosure and notification in the next sections.
The large majority (98.1%) of these requests came from law enforcement or government agencies. The remaining 1.9% were civil requests, all of which came from civil litigants wanting information about another party.
We carefully review all requests to disclose user data to ensure they adhere to our policies and satisfy all appropriate legal requirements, and we push back where they do not. As a result, we didn’t disclose user information in response to every request we received. In some cases, the request was not specific enough, and the requesting party withdrew the request after we asked for clarification. In other cases, we received very broad requests, and we were able to limit the scope of the information we provided.
When we do disclose information, we never share private content data, except in response to a search warrant. Content data includes, for example, content hosted in private repositories. With all other requests, we only share non-content data, which includes basic account information, such as username and email address, metadata (such as information about account usage or permissions), and log data regarding account activity or access history.
Of the 212 requests we received in January to June 2022, we disclosed information in response to 169 of those. We disclosed information in response to 112 subpoenas (109 criminal and 3 civil), 46 court orders, and 10 search warrants.
Those 169 disclosures affected 1,361 accounts.
We notify users when we disclose their information in response to a legal request, unless a law or court order prevents us from doing so. In many cases, legal requests are accompanied by a court order that prevents us from notifying users, commonly referred to as a gag order.
Of the 169 times we disclosed information in January to June 2022, we were only able to notify users three times. Gag orders prevented us from notifying users in 166 of the other requests.
While the number of requests with gag orders continues to be a rising trend as a percentage of overall requests, it correlates with the number of criminal requests we processed. Legal requests in criminal matters often come with a gag order, since law enforcement authorities often assert that notification would interfere with the investigation. On the other hand, civil matters are typically public record, and the target of the legal process is often a party to the litigation, obviating the need for any secrecy. None of the civil requests we processed this year came with a gag order, which means we notified each of the affected users.
In January to June 2022, we continued to see a correlation between civil requests we processed (1.9%) and our ability to notify users (1.4%). Our data from past years also reflects this trend of notification percentages correlating with the percentage of civil requests:
We’re very limited in what we can legally disclose about national security letters and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) orders. We report information about these types of requests in ranges of 250, starting with zero. As shown below, we received 0–249 notices in January to June 2022, affecting 0–249 accounts.
Governments outside the US can make cross-border data requests for user information through the DOJ via a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) or similar form of international legal process. Our Guidelines for Legal Requests of User Data explain how we handle user information requests from foreign law enforcement. Essentially, when a foreign government seeks user information from GitHub, we direct the government to the DOJ so that the DOJ can determine whether the request complies with US legal protections.
If it does, the DOJ would send us a subpoena, court order, or search warrant, which we would then process like any other requests we receive from the US government. When we receive these requests from the DOJ, they don’t necessarily come with enough context for us to know whether they’re originating from another country. However, when a request does indicate this, we capture that information in our statistics for subpoenas, court orders, and search warrants. This year, we know that four of the legal requests we processed originated as cross-border requests.
In January to June 2022, we received 22 requests directly from foreign governments. Those requests came from eight countries: one from Argentina, two from Brazil, one from Estonia, one from France, 15 from India, one from the Republic of San Marino, one from Spain, and one from Switzerland. This is an increase compared to 2021, when we received eighteen requests from five countries. Consistent with our guidelines above, in each of those cases we referred those governments to the DOJ to use the MLAT process.
In the next sections, we describe two main categories of requests we receive to remove or block user content: government takedown requests and DMCA takedown notices.
From time to time, GitHub receives requests from governments to remove content that they judge to be unlawful in their local jurisdiction. When we remove content at the request of a government, we limit it to only the jurisdiction(s) where the content is illegal whenever possible. In addition, we always post the official request that led to the block in a public government takedown repository, creating a public record where people can see that a government asked GitHub to take down content.
When we receive a request, we confirm whether:
If we determine the answer is “yes” to all three, we block the content in the narrowest way we see possible, for example, by geoblocking content only in a local jurisdiction.
In January to June 2022, GitHub received and processed one government takedown request from Russia based on local laws. This takedown resulted in one project (a GitHub Pages site) being blocked in Russia. In comparison, in January to June of 2021, we processed four takedowns that affected 39 projects from Russia and China. We have processed a significantly lower number of government takedown requests in the first halves of 2021 and 2022 as compared to similar time frames in 2020.
In addition to requests based on violations of local law, GitHub processed two requests from governments to take down content as a Terms of Service violation, affecting five accounts, eight repositories, and one GitHub Pages site from January to June 2022. These requests concerned misinformation (Australia) and GitHub Pages violations (Russia).
Consistent with our approach to content moderation across the board, GitHub handles Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) claims to maximize the availability of code by limiting disruption for legitimate projects. Accordingly, we designed our DMCA Takedown Policy to safeguard developer interests against overreaching and ambiguous takedown requests. Most content removal requests we receive are submitted under the DMCA, which allows copyright holders to ask GitHub to take down content they believe infringes on their copyright. If the user who posted the allegedly infringing content believes the takedown was a mistake or misidentification, they can then send a counter notice asking GitHub to reinstate the content.
Additionally, before processing a valid takedown notice that alleges that only part of a repository is infringing, or if we see that’s the case, we give users a chance to address the claims identified in the notice first. We also now do this with all valid notices alleging circumvention of a technical protection measure. That way, if the user removes or remediates the specific content identified in the notice, we avoid having to disable any content at all. This is an important element of our DMCA policy, given how much users rely on each other’s code for their projects.
Each time we receive a valid DMCA takedown notice, we redact personal information, as well as any reported URLs where we were unable to determine there was a violation. We then post the notice to a public DMCA repository. In 2021, we began adding annotations to certain takedown notices to help others understand how the notices were processed. For example, when we give users a chance to address claims before taking action (as we described in the previous paragraph), we note this at the top of the posted notice. We are continuing this practice in 2022, coming up with additional annotations where we think they will improve transparency around our processes or help increase understanding.
Our DMCA Takedown Policy explains more about the DMCA process, as well as the differences between takedown notices and counter notices. It also sets out the requirements for making a valid request, which include that the person submitting the notice takes into account fair use.
In January to June 2022, GitHub received and processed 1,200 valid DMCA takedown notices. This is the number of separate notices for which we took down content or asked our users to remove content. In addition, we received and processed 17 valid counter notices, and three retractions, for a total of 1,220 notices from January to June 2022. We did not receive notice of any legal action filed related to a DMCA takedown request during this reporting period.
While content can be taken down, it can also be restored. In some cases, we reinstate content that was taken down if we receive one of the following:
These definitions of “retraction” and “reversal” each refer to a takedown request. However, the same can happen with respect to a counter notice.
In January to June 2022, the total number of takedown notices ranged from 137 to 267 per month. The monthly totals for counter notices, retractions, and reversals combined ranged from zero to eight.
Often, a single takedown notice can encompass more than one project. For these instances, we looked at the total number of projects, including repositories, gists, and GitHub Pages sites that we had taken down due to DMCA takedown requests in January to June 2022.
The monthly totals for projects reinstated—based on a counter notice, retraction, or reversal—ranged from zero to 58. The number of counter notices, retractions, and reversals we receive ranges from less than one to more than five percent of the DMCA-related notices we get each month. This means that most of the time when we receive a valid takedown notice, the content comes down and stays down. In total in January to June 2022, we took down 15,883 projects and reinstated 82, which means that 15,801 projects stayed down.
The number 15,801 may sound like a lot of projects, but it’s less than .01% of the more than 200 million repositories on GitHub in 2022.
That number also includes many projects that are actually currently up. When a user makes changes in response to a takedown notice, we count that in the “stayed down” number. Because the reported content stayed down, we include it even if the rest of the project is still up. Those projects are in addition to the number reinstated.
Within our DMCA reporting, we also look specifically at takedown notices that allege circumvention of a technical protection measure under section 1201 of the DMCA. GitHub requires additional information for a DMCA takedown notice to be complete and actionable where it alleges circumvention. In 2021, we updated our DMCA Takedown Policy to include a section that specifically addresses circumvention claims and outlines our policy with respect to how we review and process such claims. We also updated our copyright claims form to more readily communicate the additional information needed to report circumvention-related claims. These changes also support our developer-first commitment and enable us to more closely track and report on this data in our transparency reports.
We are able to estimate the number of DMCA notices we processed that include a circumvention claim by searching the takedown notices we processed for relevant keywords. On that basis, we can estimate that of the 1,200 notices we processed in January to June 2022, 154 notices, or 12.8%, related to circumvention. Although takedown notices for circumvention violations have increased in the past few years, they are relatively few, and the proportion of takedown notices related to circumvention has fluctuated between roughly two and five percent of all takedown notices:
The previous DMCA numbers related to valid notices we received. We also received a lot of incomplete or insufficient notices regarding copyright infringement. Because these notices do not result in us taking down content, we do not currently keep track of how many incomplete notices we receive, or how often our users are able to work out their issues without sending a takedown notice.
Trends in DMCA data
Based on DMCA data we’ve compiled over the last few years, the number of DMCA notices we received and processed has generally correlated with growth in repositories over the same period of time. In January to June 2022, we saw this trend continue: we processed more DMCA notices than we did in previous 6-month periods, and those notices affected more projects than in most other 6-month periods.
The number of takedown notices processed per month shows an increase of roughly two notices per month, on average, while the number of projects taken down shows an increase of 27 projects affected per month, on average, excluding youtube-dl and one other outlier.
A newer category we started sharing data on in our last report is automated detection. We use automated scanning to detect some of the most egregious kinds of abuse on the platform: child sexual exploitation and abuse imagery (CSEAI) and terrorist and violent extremist content (TVEC). We scan based on robust hash matching techniques using the PhotoDNA tool. Our process also involves human review to confirm an image that is initially detected as a hit, and allows users to appeal an automated content moderation decision against them.
In January to June 2022, out of millions of images scanned, we confirmed automated detection of one account with CSEAI, which was reported to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC). None of the images scanned contained TVEC. While the data shows very little of this content on the platform, we feel it is important to put in resources to detect it to safeguard survivors and the community. It is also important to note this data does not include other staff action taken in response to reports of CSEAI or TVEC. We made five additional CSEAI reports to NCMEC based on these cases.
Reinstatements, including as a result of appeals, are a key component of fairness to our users and respect for their right to a remedy for content removal or account restrictions. Reinstatements can occur when we undo an action we had taken to disable a repository, hide an account, or suspend a user’s access to their account in response to a Terms of Service violation. While sometimes this happens because a user disputes a decision to restrict access to their content (an appeal), in many cases, we reinstate an account after a user removes content that violated our Terms of Service and agrees not to violate them going forward. For the purposes of this report, we looked at reinstatements related to:
As explained above, GitHub’s Terms of Service include numerous abuse-related restrictions on content and conduct. When we determine a violation of our Terms of Service has occurred, we have a number of enforcement actions we can take. In keeping with our approach of restricting content in the narrowest way possible to address the violation, sometimes we can resolve an issue by disabling one repository (taking down one project) rather than acting on an entire account. Other times, we may need to act at the account level, for example, if the same user is committing the same violation across several repositories.
At the account level, in some cases we will only need to hide a user’s account content—for example, when the violation is based on content being publicly posted—while still giving the user the ability to access their account. In other cases, we will only need to restrict a user’s access to their account—for example, when the violation is based on their interaction with other users—while still giving other users the ability to access their shared content. For a collaborative software development platform like GitHub, we realized we need to provide this option so that other users can still access content that may provide value to their projects.
We reported on restrictions and reinstatements by type of action taken. In January to June 2022, we hid 4,913 accounts and reinstated 356 hidden accounts. We restricted a repository owner’s access to 268 accounts and reinstated it for 16 accounts. For 2,617 accounts, we both hid and restricted the repository owner’s access, lifting both of those restrictions to fully reinstate 54 accounts and lifting one but not the other to partially reinstate 18 accounts. As for abuse-related restrictions at the project level, we disabled 1,766 projects and reinstated four. These do not count DMCA related takedowns or reinstatements (for example, due to counter notices), which are reported on in the DMCA section (above).
We’re dedicated to empowering as many developers around the world as possible to collaborate on GitHub. The US government has imposed sanctions on several countries and regions (Crimea, separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria), which means GitHub isn’t fully available in some of those places. However, GitHub will continue advocating to US regulators for the greatest possible access to code collaboration services for developers in sanctioned regions. For example, in January 2021 we secured a license from the US government to make all GitHub services fully available to developers in Iran. We are continuing to work toward a similar outcome for developers in Crimea and Syria. Our services are also generally available to developers located in Cuba, aside from specially designated nationals, other denied or blocked parties under US and other applicable law, and certain government officials.
Although trade control laws require GitHub to restrict account access from certain regions, we enable users to appeal these restrictions, and we work with them to restore as many accounts as we legally can. In many cases, we can reinstate a user’s account (grant an appeal), for example after they returned from temporarily traveling to a restricted region or if their account was flagged in error. More information on GitHub and trade controls can be found here.
We started tracking sanctions-related appeals in July 2019. Unlike abuse-related appeals, we must always act at the account level (as opposed to being able to disable a repository) because trade controls laws require us to restrict a user’s access to GitHub. In January to June 2022, 464 users appealed trade-control related account restrictions, as compared to 591 in January to June 2021. Of the 464 appeals we received in January to June 2022, we approved 355 and denied 103, and required further information to process in six cases. We also received 78 appeals that were mistakenly filed by users who were not subject to trade controls, so we excluded these from our analysis below.
Appeals varied widely by region in January to June 2022, ranging from 173 related to Crimea to six related to Luhansk People’s Republic. In 85 cases, we were unable to assign an appeal to a region in our data. We marked them as “Unknown” in the table below. The number of appeals from Crimea decreased as compared to 2021, while the number of appeals from Syria increased.
Maintaining transparency and promoting free expression are an essential part of our commitment to developers. We aim to lead by example in our approach to transparency by providing in-depth explanation of the areas of content removal that are most relevant to developers and software development platforms. Central to this commitment is protecting user privacy, free association, assembly, and expression by limiting the amount of user data we disclose, and the amount of legitimate content we take down, within the bounds of the law. Through our transparency reports, we shed light on our own practices, while joining in a broader discourse on platform governance. We look forward to finding even more opportunities to expand our transparency reporting in the future.
We hope you found this report helpful and encourage you to let us know if you have suggestions for additions to future reports. For more on how we develop GitHub’s policies and procedures, check out our site policy repository.
